When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act
done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it
Provided that the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment
Illustration
- A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that
purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the
food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence
of A’s instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of
the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the
child to put the poison into the food of Y.
- A instigates B to burn Z’s house, B sets fire to the house and at the same time
commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not
guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence
of the burning.
- A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of
robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and
being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable
consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder